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DISCUSSION
Tenenbaum and Raffman on Vague
Projects, the Self-Torturer,
and the Sorites*
Luke Elson
Sergio Tenenbaum and Diana Raffman contend that ‘vague projects’ motivate rad-
ical revisions to orthodox, utility-maximizing rational choice theory. Their argu-
ment cannot succeed if such projects merely ground instances of the paradox of
the sorites, or heap. Tenenbaum and Raffman are not blind to this and argue that
Warren Quinn’s Puzzle of the Self-Torturer does not rest on the sorites. I argue that
their argument both fails to generalize to most vague projects and is ineffective in
the case of the Self-Torturer itself.
SELF-TORTURE AND RATIONAL CHOICE
We often attach value ðutilityÞ to vague projects which—like ‘is a heap’—
lack precise satisfaction conditions, but such projects engender puzzles
for rational choice theory. You may wish for a restful night’s sleep, but to
stay up as late as possible as is consistent with that. Since restful is vague,
one minute of sleep apparently couldn’t make the difference between a
restful and a nonrestful night, and you ought to stay up for another min-
ute. But foreseeably, if you keep thinking that way, you will stay up all night.
To get a restful night, you must at some point reject such momentary cal-
* For comments and discussion, I am indebted to several anonymous reviewers, John
Broome, Ryan Doody, Thomas Hofweber, Brad Hooker, Douglas MacLean, Katherine
Meehan, Julia Nefsky, Ram Neta, David Oderberg, C. D. C. Reeve, John Roberts, Geoffrey
Sayre-McCord, Keith Simmons, Susan Wolf, and audiences at the North Carolina Philo-
sophical Society, Chapel Hill, Reading, and York.
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culations. But simply saying ‘don’t even go down that road’ is a bad re-
sponse to this puzzle: you would never leave your bed.
The challenge is to balance or weigh your competing goals. Philoso-
phers—most recently Sergio Tenenbaum and Diana Raffman1—have ar-
gued that orthodox utility-maximizing rational choice theory cannot do
so and that it fails under conditions of vagueness. In this article, I defend
orthodoxy against Tenenbaum and Raffman’s argument.
Their argument appeals to a classic of this genre, Warren Quinn’s
Puzzle of the Self-Torturer, which I restate only briefly here:2
Puzzle of the Self-Torturer. A torture device is attached irrevers-
ibly to a person ‘ST’. The device has a dial—currently set to 0, with
settings up to 1,000—which can only be turned up, in single incre-
ments, every week; each turn of the dial permanently increases the
amount of electricity running through ST’s body. The difference be-
tween adjacent settings is very small, but higher settings are agonis-
ing. Every time she turns the dial, ST gets $10,000.
In the original puzzle, “the self-torturer cannot feel any difference in com-
fort between adjacent settings . . . ½and . . . appears to have a clear and
repeatable reason to increase the voltage each week.”3 A natural question
is how putatively imperceptible differences in electrical current could amount
to severe differences in pain. But our main problem—that of vague proj-
ects—arises even if each setting is perceptibly but slightly more painful
than the previous one. With the right preferences, even fairly severe life-
long pain could be ‘worth’ $10,000. We set aside questions of impercepti-
bility for the moment and return to them later.
Now, if ST has turned the dial k times, she must decide whether to
advance to setting k 1 1. Orthodoxy says she must: doesn’t the utility
from $10,000 outweigh the disutility of a small increase in electric cur-
rent? Since k was arbitrary, by parity of reasoning, she must advance to
the end. ST indeed seems to have ‘clear and repeatable reason’ to turn the
dial each week.
But this is foreseeably the route to disaster. If ST is like most of us,
she would far rather turn the dial ten times and gain $100,000 than ad-
vance all the way into agony. Utility maximization has led her astray. This
seems to show that you do better by deviating from a central tenet of or-
thodoxy:
1. Sergio Tenenbaum and Diana Raffman, “Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the Self-
Torturer,” Ethics 123 ð2012Þ: 86–112.
2. See Warren S. Quinn, “The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer,” Philosophical Studies 59
ð1990Þ: 79–90, esp. 79, for the canonical presentation.
3. Ibid., 79.
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Tenet. At every choice point, act to maximize ðexpectedÞ utility.
That is the puzzle: ST seems always required by Tenet to advance one
more stage. But she can see that if she continues to do so, she will even-
tually disprefer the outcome. Similarly, you would prefer to get 7.5 hours
of sleep and feel rested, but Tenet apparently keeps you up all night. And
if we do better by disobeying Tenet, how can an account of rational choice
that includes it be correct?
HETERODOX VIEWS
On this basis, many philosophers defend strikingly heterodox accounts of
rational choice. Quinn himself argued that the Self-Torturer has genuinely
intransitive preferences and that the puzzle “reveals a quasi-deontological
aspect to a fully adequate theory of rational choice.”4
More recently, Sergio Tenenbaum and Diana Raffman have argued
that Tenet does not apply to vague projects, including ST’s goal of avoid-
ing pain: “We propose that a vague project issues in a requirement and a
set of permissions. The requirement is just an instance of the instrumen-
tal requirement: insofar as one is rational one must adopt ðwhat one be-
lieves to beÞ themeans ðincluding constitutivemeansÞ necessary to execute
one’s project. The permissions are permissions to execute the project in
some momentary actions rather than simply maximizing utility in light
of one’s preferences for momentary actions considered in isolation.”5
They argue that a refusal by ST to turn the dial cannot be justified
on the grounds of utility, but “the pain-free life project issues permission
to stop turning the dial, independently of what maximizes utility in light
of ST’s momentary preferences.” Even if utility is maximized by ad-
vancing one stage, ST has permission to refuse.6 Sometimes, even though
it would maximize utility for ST to turn the dial now, she is rationally per-
mitted ðperhaps requiredÞ to refrain. Utilities do not serve as a guide to
life: “By reflecting on the nature of vague projects, we learn that in such
cases we cannot simply plug weights in to various ends to generate a
preference-ordering; rationality is not always purely calculative.”7 Clearly,
this view is supported by the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer only if utility max-
imization indeed fails in that case, by leading ST to disaster.
Since these cases hang on vagueness, a natural thought is that they
are somehow instances of the paradox of the sorites, or heap. In that par-
adox, it is compelling that removing one grain from a heap of sand leaves a
4. Ibid., 87.
5. Tenenbaum and Raffman, “Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer,” 102.
6. Ibid., 106.
7. Ibid., 111.
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nonheap: that if n grains form a heap, then n 2 1 grains form a heap.
But if 10,000 grains form a heap, this implies ðvia repeatedmodus ponensÞ
that five grains form a heap, even in contexts where this is clearly false.
Such reasoning is a sorites on ‘is a heap’. It is vague where we tip from
a heap into a nonheap, and this renders the predicate ‘sorites embed-
dable’. Sorites hang on tolerance principles such as ‘one grain couldn’t
be the difference between a heap and a nonheap’; tolerance principles
ðat least in their universally quantified formsÞ are widely agreed to be false,
although compelling.
Theories of vagueness fall into two broad camps. Indeterminists claim
that there is an indeterminate minimum number of grains required for a
heap, perhaps because meaning depends on use, and our use has not
fixed a precise threshold. The relevant tolerance principle has a false in-
stance, but it is indeterminate which. On epistemic views, some instance of
the tolerance principle is determinately false, but we don’t ðperhaps can’tÞ
know which.8 It is common ground that universally quantified tolerance
principles are false: one of their instances is false, but it is indeterminate
or unknowable which.
If the puzzle is simply an instance of the sorites, then the challenge
to orthodox rational choice theory is liable to dissolve. If claims such as
that turning the dial is always required on utility-maximizing grounds and
that ST has ‘clear and repeatable reason’ to turn the dial—which are at
the heart of the putative counterexample to orthodoxy—are equivalent to
a tolerance principle, and as such are false.
Of course, Tenenbaum and Raffman are not blind to the challenge
of the sorites. But in their long and rich paper, they mention the paradox
only once:
Readers familiar with the sorites paradox may wonder whether the
self-torturer puzzle is just an especially picturesque instance of it: per-
haps ST is proceeding along a sorites series of pains from a clearly
bearable one to a clearly unbearable one, attempting to decide where
the bearable ones end and the unbearable begin. However, this way
of thinking about ST overlooks a crucial element of her situation: at
each step of the way she is also trying to decide whether a certain in-
cremental difference in pain can be compensated by $10,000 at that
point in the spectrum of her pain. The latter task is what appears to
8. For indeterminism, see Kit Fine, “Vagueness, Truth and Logic,” Synthese 30 ð1975Þ:
265–300; Rosanna Keefe,Theories of Vagueness ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000Þ;
Cian Dorr, “Vagueness without Ignorance,” Philosophical Perspectives 17 ð2003Þ: 83–113; and
Elizabeth Barnes, “Arguments against Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vagueness,” Philoso-
phy Compass 5 ð2010Þ: 953–64. For epistemicism, see R. A. Sorensen, Blindspots ðOxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1988Þ; and Timothy Williamson,Vagueness ðLondon: Routledge, 1994Þ.
The ‘tolerance’ terminology is due to Crispin Wright, “On the Coherence of Vague Pred-
icates,” Synthese 30 ð1975Þ: 325–65.
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put pressure on her rationality and is, at bottom, the source of the
puzzle.9
This argument involves two claims: that vague projects involve distinc-
tively comparative tasks and that they therefore cannot be seen as a so-
rites. In the next sections, I argue that neither stands up to scrutiny.
THE SHEPHERD IN A PRACTICAL SORITES
The quoted argument appeals to distinctive features of ST’s situation
which put ‘pressure on her rationality’. But since Tenenbaum and Raff-
man are defending a general thesis that vague projects are exceptions
to orthodox rational choice theory, an appeal to distinctive features of
one particular case of vagueness—such as the ‘comparative’ nature of ST’s
plight—is a non sequitur. Indeed, many of the vague projects they dis-
cuss—such as that of writing a book—do involve trying to decide where
the books end and the nonbooks begin and are akin to that of sleeping
restfully.
In this section, I argue that the decision-theoretic puzzles arising from
such noncomparative cases are most naturally seen as sorites. The chal-
lenge of vagueness was first articulated by Richard Tuck, in a somewhat
overlooked example:
He could be a shepherd who wishes to build a cairn of stones by
himself to guide him in the hills. On setting out in the morning, he
can reason as follows. If I work all day, I will have a suitable pile of
stones by nightfall. But one stone added to a collection of other stones
makes a negligible difference—it can never be enough to tip it over
the edge and into a heap. It takes a certain amount of time and effort
to find a spare stone. If I do not start immediately, I will still have a
heap of stones at nightfall, since the stone I could have picked up in
the next few minutes would have made no difference to the outcome.
But the same applies to the next stone, and the next: there is no point
in ever beginning. Moreover, at some time in the day it will be clear
that I have passed the stage where I will have enough time to build a
cairn, and after that point there is certainly no benefit to be gained
by piling up stones.10
Once again, it appears that utility maximization foreseeably leads to a
dispreferred outcome, since the shepherd will not build a cairn. Maximi-
zation seems to prevent him from starting the job.
9. Tenenbaum and Raffman, “Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer,” 88 n. 3.
10. See Richard Tuck, “Is There a Free-Rider Problem and If So What Is It?” in
Rational Action, ed. Ross Harrison ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979Þ, 147–56,
154. Cairns are heaps of rocks or stones, often used to mark mountain trails.
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To bring out how vagueness affects the shepherd’s predicament, con-
sider how his situation looks when made artificially precise:
The precise cairn builder. Another shepherd, John, will get 200 utils
from building a cairn by nightfall. A cairn consists of fifteen stones;
once he starts building, he cannot stop. Each stone takes thirty min-
utes to move and costs 4 utils ðhe will miss one episode of his favorite
television showÞ. He has ten hours before nightfall; the cairn will be
useless if not completed by then.
Intuitively, it is clear that John ought to enjoy 2.5 hours of television and
then build a cairn with precisely fifteen stones before nightfall. He will
gain 140 utils: 200 utils for the cairn minus 60 utils from moving fifteen
stones. ðWe set aside questions about whether it is really rational for him
to leave it to the last minute like this, without setting aside a ‘margin of
safety’, which form a different set of issues.Þ
If John starts earlier or later, then he is irrational: either he fails to
build a cairn, or he piles up an excessive number of stones, to no addi-
tional benefit. Starting late and then building a partial cairn is clearly the
worst strategy. He not only gets no value from a partial cairn but also loses
value from the television programs he misses, for no compensating ben-
efit. If he has left it too late to build a cairn, then he should not start.
As expected, Tenet explains each of these judgments. Every thirty
minutes, John must start moving stones or wait. If he has already waited
k stages of thirty minutes, then applying Tenet, he ought to wait for
stage k 1 1 just in case utility is maximized by doing so. In utility terms,
stage k 1 1 differs from k in just two relevant ways—more leisure time and
one less stone on the cairn.
Stage k 1 1 always involves more leisure time; k 1 1 is worse in cairn
terms only if the cairn can be built at k but not at k 1 1. Utility is maxi-
mized by waiting for k 1 1 rather than starting to build at k, unless the
cairn is buildable at k but not at k 1 1.11 And ‘the cairn is buildable at k
but not at k 1 1’ is false at all points except one—the point when there is
enough time left to carry exactly fifteen stones. In this precise case, Tenet
correctly requires that John start work at the last point when he can still
finish the cairn by nightfall.
But what about the original vague case? As Tuck notes, this case is
clearly parasitic on the vagueness of ‘is a cairn’, which is sorites embed-
dable. The relevant tolerance principle is:
ðCairn ToleranceÞ. If n stones form a cairn, then n 2 1 stones form
a cairn.
11. I’m assuming here that the following situation does not obtain: stage 2 is worse than
stage 1, but stage 3 is better than both stage 2 and stage 1. Such ‘darker before the dawn’ cases
are a little more complicated, but not fundamentally different.
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We thus get a sorites series: twenty stones form a cairn; if twenty stones
form a cairn, then nineteen stones form a cairn; . . . if six stones form a
cairn, then five stones form a cairn. But five stones do not form a cairn.
Since it is better to build a cairn with fewer stones if possible, we also get
a sorites on ‘better’:
It is better for John to build with nineteen stones than twenty;
If nineteen stones are better than twenty, then eighteen are
better than nineteen;
. . .
If six stones are better than seven, then five are better than six.
I use ‘better’ subjectively, to mean that an option is preferable utility-
wise. By the transitivity of ‘better’ on such a characterization, and via a
sorites series, we reach the false conclusion that it is better for John to
build with five stones than with twenty. This is how the cairn builder is
caught in a sorites series.
We may call this a practical sorites. Unlike the standard ‘theoretical’
case, John cannot simply withhold judgment or say ‘it’s borderline’: he
must act according to the application of a predicate. Is this the minimum
number of stones required for a cairn or not?
Instances of the tolerance principle ðCairn ToleranceÞ fall into three
groups. For high numbers of stones ðclear cairnsÞ, it is clearly true. In a
third group, with low numbers of stones ðclear noncairnsÞ, Cairn Toler-
ance has a false antecedent and is clearly true. In between, Cairn Toler-
ance has a false instance. So much is common ground between the precise
and the vague cases.
But when it is vague which instance is false, the central instance be-
comes a penumbra, where there are borderline cairns composed of mid-
dling numbers of stones. Here, instances of the principle are borderline,
construed neutrally between indeterminism and epistemicism: indeter-
minate or unknowable. Whatever the theory of vagueness, the tolerance
principle ðCairn ToleranceÞ has a false instance in this penumbra.
We can now see that Tenenbaum and Raffman’s argument doesn’t
support the general thesis that vague projects do not engender sorites.
The shepherd is ‘proceeding along a sorites series of ½piles of rocks from a
½clear cairn to a ½clear noncairn, attempting to decide where the ½cairns
end and the ½noncairns begin’. Some vague projects can be seen as sorites.
THE SELF-TORTURER AS PRACTICAL SORITES
But utility maximization is a general theory, and just one counterexample
would falsify it. Even if Tenenbaum and Raffman are wrong about many
other vague projects, what about their argument that the sorites could
not be ‘the source of the puzzle’ for ST?
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It has some force. In the paradox of the heap, 1 million grains form a
heap, and if n grains form a heap, then n2 1 grains form a heap. The Self-
Torturer doesn’t seem to be like this. What predicate corresponds to ‘is a
heap’? They imply that it would be something like ‘is a bearable level of
pain’. A sorites on this predicate would, as they rightly say, misdescribe
the puzzle. ST is making a comparative judgment—is this additional pain
worth $10,000?—which doesn’t seem reducible to a fruitless search for
the edge of a predicate’s extension.
But it is a mistake to think that a sorites account of the Self-Torturer
must have this form. It is not quite explicit that Tenenbaum and Raffman
do think this, but if not, then their argument is manifestly ineffective. A
rational ST is certainly not looking for the last bearable pain: intuitively,
she should stop long before that point. If there is a sorites here, it is not
one on a predicate like ‘is a bearable level of pain’ but on something more
comparative: is this pain increment worth this money increment? In fo-
cusing on noncomparative predicates, Tenenbaum and Raffman under-
play the resources of the sorites view.
Further consideration of the shepherd’s case suggests how ST may
also be caught in a sorites. The shepherd is actually performing both of
the tasks distinguished by Tenenbaum and Raffman. He is proceeding
along a sorites series of ½piles of rocks from a ½clear cairn to a ½clear
noncairn, attempting to decide where the ½cairns end and the ½non-
cairns begin; he is also trying to decide whether a certain incremental
difference in ½the number of stones can be compensated by ½extra leisure
time at that point in the spectrum of ½stones.
For the shepherd, the outcome of the latter ‘comparative’ task is de-
termined by that of the former ‘categorical’ task. Tenenbaum and Raffman
are correct that ST doesn’t seem to face such a categorical task. But their
mistake is to think that therefore the case cannot be seen as a sorites: we
can exhibit a sorites ‘directly’ on the comparative task.
Two Kinds of Vague Project
To do show that ST is caught in a sorites, I wish to introduce a distinction
between two kinds of desires, or projects. First:
Binary desire. A binary desire thata is F is unsatisfied if a is not
F and satisfied if a is F.
Binary desires divide worlds or states of affairs into those where they are
satisfied and those where they aren’t. My desire to go to Churchill,
Manitoba, and see the polar bears is binary: it is satisfied in worlds where
I go and unsatisfied in worlds where I do not. The desire for a cairn is
similarly binary, despite its vagueness: the shepherd’s desire is satisfied if
and only if he has a cairn. Your desire for a restful night’s sleep is also bi-
nary and vague.
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But some desires are not like this:
Essentially comparative desire. An essentially comparative desire is for
things that are more F rather than less F. There is no ‘F-ness thresh-
old’ beyond which adding F-ness is not desired.
Essentially comparative desires do not divide worlds but rank them. In-
stead of desiring to see a polar bear, I might prefer to see larger mammals
over smaller ones. I prefer seeing an elephant to seeing a polar bear to
seeing a Scottish Wildcat. One cannot say outright whether such a desire
has been satisfied—satisfied compared to what?
The shepherd’s desire to watch more television is comparative, as are
ST’s desires for more money and less pain and your desire for more
waking minutes. In the rational choice literature, comparative desires or
projects are often marked with phrases like ‘utilities linear in dollars’.12
Crucially, in the essentially comparative case, given a situation, there is
both a better and a worse situation. For some amount of money, there is
a preferred ðall else being equalÞ situation where you have more and a
dispreferred ðall else being equalÞ situation where you have less. ðPerhaps
this is not so in extreme cases: one might be genuinely indifferent be-
tween $1 trillion and $2 trillion, given actual facts about the world.Þ
This distinction explains a structural difference between the cairn
builder and the Self-Torturer. If the shepherd waits too long, then he
ought to watch more television and at least salvage something of the day,
since he gets no utility from a partial cairn. Thus, he seems to pass grad-
ually from ‘there’s no point starting now—it would be overkill’ to ‘there’s
no point starting now—it’s too late’. The shepherd’s binary desire for a
cairn becomes rationally inert once it can no longer be satisfied.
But we would not say that once ST ‘has gone too far’ and regrets
turning the dial so many times, she ought to keep taking the deal. That
would just make things worse. Even once ST has passed the optimum
trade-off of pain and money, there are many settings that are clearly worse,
with respect to her essentially comparative desire for less pain.
A Model of a Self-Torture Sorites
Now, we can construct a model of ST’s plight as a sorites series. Our main
aim is to use a minimal set of assumptions to adequately explain the key
features of the puzzle and to show that the comparative structure iden-
tified by Tenenbaum and Raffman is no barrier to seeing the case as a
sorites.
Again, let’s imagine a fully precise version of the puzzle. FromQuinn’s
description, we obtain several intuitively plausible constraints:
12. See, e.g., Adam Elga, “Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp,” Philosophers’
Imprint 10 ð2010Þ: 1–11, 4.
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1. STcares only about money and pain: her net utility is the sum of
the utility of the money and the disutility of the pain. At setting
zero, she has none of either, so her net utility is zero.
2. The marginal utility of taking the deal is initially positive: at set-
ting 2 with $20,000, for example, ST’s net utility is positive. This
is plausible and implicit in Quinn’s discussion of filtered series.13
3. ST eventually has negative total utility, since she prefers setting
zero to some later stages.
For precise utility functions, then, figure 1 shows how we might graph ST’s
utility. This graph might need some justification. Here I have for ease of
presentation treatedmachine settings as continuous rather than discrete
ðthis is wholly unrealistic but does not substantially affect the caseÞ.
Money utility is modeled as five times machine setting, and pain disutility
is modeled as approximately 1.333 raised to the power of the machine
setting.14 These functions are arbitrary, but other utility functions which
respect constraints 1–3 will—assuming no gross discontinuity—generate
a graph with a similar structure.
We now see that when ST crosses from zone 1 ðwhere the slope of
the money-utility line exceeds that of the pain-disutility lineÞ into zone 3
ðwhere the relative slopes are reversedÞ, there is a point—call it zone 2—
where the net-utility line peaks and then turns down. ðSince earlier dial
turns have positive marginal utility, but later ones negative, her utility
functions for machine settings and for money cannot both be linear.Þ15
After this, the relative gradients change, and advancing further—into
zone 3—decreases net utility. Here the slope of the pain line exceeds that
of the money line.
We are most interested in the point where net utility ‘tops out’
ðzone 2Þ, where the difference between accumulated money utility and
pain utility is maximized. Clearly, ST ought stop here, and orthodoxy ex-
plains this. Suppose utility is maximized at setting 10, as it is in figure 1.
Before that point, the marginal utility of turning the dial is positive, but at
stage 10, marginal disutility of the extra pain at stage 11 outweighs the mar-
ginal utility of the extra money, and turning the dial is impermissible. Or-
thodox utility maximization correctly mandates that ST accept the deal
until setting 10—the point with the highest net utility—and then stop.
In this precise version, ST should, according to both intuition and
Tenet, stop at stage 10, maximizing utility. Unlike in the precise shepherd
case, there is nothing akin to the last stage at which a cairn is buildable.
13. Quinn, “Puzzle of the Self-Torturer,” 86.
14. More precisely, the pain-utility function is eWð50Þx/10, which is chosen for neatness:
ST ought to stop at setting 10.
15. I am grateful to Richard Yetter Chappell for forcing me to be clear on this point.
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Here, there is no simple categorical project that we can ‘look through’ to,
so we must speak directly in terms of weighting ST’s two projects, of less
pain and more money. Nevertheless, the orthodox view renders the cor-
rect verdict.
In a vague version of the Self-Torturer, ST’s utility functions are vague:
it is vague at what setting the slope of the pain line overtakes that of the
money line. Speaking metaphorically, zone 2 is ‘smeared’ into a region,
just as the zone of where a cairn becomes a noncairn is smeared.
We thus get a sorites on ‘maximizes utility’: for low settings ðzone 1Þ,
it is false that utility is maximized; in a penumbra ðzone 2Þ, it is vague
whether utility is maximized; later ðzone 3Þ, it is again false. The tolerance
principle is:
ðTorturer ToleranceÞ. If setting k does not maximize utility, then
setting k 1 1 does not maximize utility.
This formulation is a material conditional, so it is true except at that point
when the pain utility begins to dominate money utility ðwhere the deriv-
ative/slope of the former overtakes that of the latterÞ. The tolerance prin-
ciple is false only at that point at which utility is maximized; I argue that
there is such a point—although its location may be vague.
As we saw, the difference between the binary and essentially com-
parative desires explains how one ought behave once one has already
FIG. 1.—ST’s utility
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‘gone too far’. In zone 1, it is determinately true that the marginal utility
of turning the dial is positive: the net-utility line has a clearly positive slope.
In zone 2, it is borderline whether the marginal utility of turning the dial
is positive or negative. In zone 3, the marginal utility of turning the dial is
clearly negative: each stage is worse than the previous.
Thus, we can explain why once ST has proceeded too far, into zone 3,
repeatedly advancing is clearly disadvantageous. In the binary cairn builder
case, the net utility slope ‘after the borderline zone’, so to speak, is pos-
itive. In the comparative self-torture case, it is negative.
The Puzzle of the Self-Torturer is only superficially simple: apart from
the imperceptibility we have set aside, it requires a nontrivial strategy of ST:
stop when the derivative of her pain-utility function exceeds that of her
money-utility function. This opaque structure grounds an objection: why
believe Torturer Tolerance? It’s not as intuitively compelling as ‘if k grains
are a heap, then k 2 1 grains are a heap’. But the sorites story works only
if the principle is plausible enough to explain the judgment that each par-
ticular stage is preferable to the previous one.16
The first response to this objection is to dodge it: we do find such a
judgment compelling—otherwise the Self-Torturer scenario wouldn’t be
so troubling—and in this sorites, Torturer Tolerance is equivalent to that
judgment. So the compelling plausibility of the judgment/tolerance prin-
ciple is agreed background.
But we might hope that a theory of vague projects would explain the
claim’s plausibility, not just appeal to it. The plausibility of tolerance prin-
ciples is an important question in theorizing about vagueness. In the orig-
inal paradox, for example, when we imagine that the penumbra is about
100 grains ‘wide’, we can imagine why the relevant tolerance principle is
compelling: for any particular grain, it seems incredible that that grain
could be the cutoff. By parity of reasoning, so it seems for any grain.
We might say something similar here. Plausibly, our preferences are
not completely determinate and knowable, and it is vague which setting is
optimum, or where pain begins to outweigh money, so to speak. Anyone
who accepts this, and the structural constraints on the puzzle in the pre-
cise case, must accept that zone 2—where utility is maximized, which de-
pends on our preferences—will be a penumbra rather than a point. Given
that there are a thousand settings on the device, this penumbra may be
rather wide: for any setting therein, it seems incredible that that setting
is the tipping point. After all, the penumbra of ‘is a cairn’ is only perhaps
five stones ‘wide’, and that was sufficient to ground a sorites.
With this machinery, we can somewhat artificially cast ST’s plight
in noncomparative terms. Although she is not ‘proceeding along a sorites
series of pains from a clearly bearable one to a clearly unbearable one, at-
16. I owe this objection to an anonymous reviewer.
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tempting to decide where the bearable ones end and the unbearable
begin’, ST is proceeding along a sorites series of dial turns from those
with clearly positive marginal utility to those with clearly negative mar-
ginal utility, attempting to decide where the positive/required ones end
and the negative/impermissible begin.
CONCLUSION
If the foregoing is correct, then Tenenbaum and Raffman’s case for het-
erodoxy is undermined. It is false that the shepherd always maximizes
utility by waiting and, thus, false that orthodox rational choice theory
condemns him to never building the cairn. Those claims are equivalent
to the principle Cairn Tolerance, since he always ought to wait if and
only if no stone makes the difference between a cairn and a noncairn.
Given that such tolerance principles are false, orthodox rational choice
theory does not so condemn him, and his predicament doesn’t falsify the
orthodox view.
And since Torturer Tolerance has a false instance, there is a k such
that setting k doesn’t maximize utility, but setting k1 1 does. According to
orthodox rational choice theory, ST ought turn the dial to setting k 1 1
and no further. The decision-theoretic constraints are similar to the pre-
cise case, except that k is vague: indeterminate or unknowable.
Since the universally quantified tolerance principle is equivalent
ðgiven our plausible constraints about the structure of the puzzleÞ to the
claim that ST always maximizes utility by turning the dial, we know that
the latter is false. The central challenge of the puzzle was this: can we rec-
oncile the intuitive need to stop before somewhere with the apparent
utility-maximizing requirement to advance at every point? But since the
puzzle is a sorites, there is no such requirement, and heterodox ‘permis-
sions’ to diverge from utility considerations are otiose.
This line of argument, of course, hangs on the falsity of universally
quantified tolerance principles, which could be denied. The argument
is therefore conditional on the truth of what we might call a ‘tolerance-
denying’ account of vagueness.17 But such accounts are both overwhelm-
ingly plausible and overwhelmingly popular. In any case, doubts here do
nothing to support Tenenbaum and Raffman’s argument that vague proj-
ects do not ground sorites.
If seeing the case as a sorites undermines the motivation for het-
erodox views, can it contribute a positive story? A full account is beyond
the scope of this article, but here we may sketch an orthodox, utility-
maximizing explanation of the key intuitive facts about ST: she ought to
17. I’m grateful to Julia Nefsky for discussion of this point.
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turn the dial a few times and then stop; she is rational if and only if she
stops in some central zone: the borderline zone 2.
Epistemicists can easily explain this, as a mere case of action under
ignorance ðin this case, of her own preferencesÞ. Indeterminists can also
show that the borderline zone is the only rationally permissible place for
ST to stop advancing and that no point therein is determinately pref-
erable to any other.
At each setting in zone 2, it is indeterminate whether utility is maxi-
mized. There is a point in the zone ðit is indeterminate which pointÞ where
the slope of the pain line exceeds that of the money line, and net utility
peaks. At each stage in that zone, it is indeterminate whether this turning
point has not yet been reached ðST should advanceÞ, is at hand ðST
should stopÞ, or has already been passed ðST should stop and retreat if
possibleÞ. Each point in the zone is borderline optimal, and none is de-
terminately superior to any other.
So if ST stops in that penumbra, it is indeterminate whether she
maximizes utility. But if ST stops outside the zone, then it is determi-
nately false that she maximizes utility. If she stops beforehand, then she
could have done better by advancing further; if she stops afterward, then
it is determinate that she has gone too far. For each point outside the
borderline zone, there is determinately a point within that zone with
higher utility.
Plausibly, if her options are ðiÞ make it indeterminate whether she
maximizes utility or ðiiÞ make it determinate that she does not, then she
ought to ðiÞ. This is not in general true—if one can either make it in-
determinate whether one gets 100 or 10 utils or determinate that one
gets 80 utils, then one ought to do the latter—but the ‘aggregative’ con-
siderations that ground exceptions don’t seem to apply here.18 If she ought
to make it indeterminate whether she maximizes in this manner, then on
the sorites account, the Self-Torturer is akin to an indeterminist Ass of
Buridan: she should simply pick some point in the second zone.
None of this amounts to a general account of the Puzzle of the Self-
Torturer. In particular, the issue that we set aside at the beginning—the
apparent imperceptibility of the torture increments—poses trouble for
any view. If the increase in electrical current is genuinely imperceptible,
then it is hard to see how refusing an extra $10,000 could ever be jus-
tified: pain is only bad because it feels bad, and if the difference is
imperceptible, then one feels no worse after accepting the money.
The central question is whether it is really coherent to suggest that
the adjacent settings are indiscriminable: together with the claim that
indiscriminability is transitive, it leads to the particularly nasty phenome-
18. For a representative denial that such aggregation can be justified, see J. Robert G.
Williams, “Decision-Making under Indeterminacy,” Philosophers’ Imprint 14 ð2014Þ: 1–34.
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nal sorites. Phenomenal sorites can be constructed for all kinds of pred-
icates, with ‘is loud’, ‘is red’, and ‘is cold’ being particularly common
examples. So the move to the perceptible case—not only in this dis-
cussion but also in that of Tenenbaum and Raffman19—was a substantial
weakening of the puzzle. A full account of ST’s plight has not been
provided here or elsewhere, in terms of the sorites or otherwise. Nev-
ertheless, Tenenbaum and Raffman have failed to show that the chal-
lenge of vague projects to orthodox rational choice theory is not, as they
put it, “just an especially picturesque instance” of the sorites.
19. See, e.g., Tenenbaum and Raffman, “Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the Self-
Torturer,” 94.
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